AIR HISTORICAL BRANCH TRANSLATION NO. VII/I
___________________________
(8th
Abteilung) and dated 24th December, 1943
Translated by:-
Air Ministry, A.H.B.6.
1st October, 1946.
1. The primary task of a
strategic air force is the conduct of offensive warfare against the air forces
of the enemy, his armament industry, lines of communication and other targets
of economic importance. This was effected so rapidly in the 1939 Polish
Campaign that the Luftwaffe was also able to give direct support of the army.
In France, Norway and the Balkans, strategic aerial warfare was not carried to
an altogether satisfactory conclusion, but close support attacks by bomber and
dive-bomber formations on targets of importance indicated by the army were
nevertheless carried out. The absolute necessity for such attacks was not
always apparent; had it been necessary the army could, in most cases, have
carried on without the help of the Luftwaffe. These operations, however, showed
clearly the enormous and unlimited extent to which such attacks could assist
the army; dive bomber formations, in particular, did splendid work in this
sphere.
2. The problem of how far
direct air support was absolutely necessary had not been determined by the beginning of the Russian Campaign and no rigid plan for ground support attacks operating to the possible exclusion of strategic bombing had been drawn up. The campaign therefore began with strategic bombing against the Soviet Air Force, bombing of airfields in enemy use, attacks on Moscow and large scale raids on enemy aircraft production centres. The demands of the army were also met as far as it was possible and practical to do so.
3. The whole situation was
altered by the ever-growing Russian counter-offensive. The attacks carried out
with maximum strength by the Russians in the Winter of 1941-42 placed the German
Army in a position where it became imperative that all available forces should
be used purely for defensive purposes. The lack of ground attack and
dive-bomber formations led to the employment of bomber units against
concentrations of Russian troops, salients and tank and artillery emplacements.
For these tasks the “Nahkampfführer”, later called “Fliegerdivisionen”, were
created. To those were subordinated the few available ground attack and
dive-bomber formations along with an ever increasing number of bomber
Geschwader, with the task of supporting the hard pressed infantry in defensive
warfare. How great the necessity for all-out support to the infantry had become
is shown by the creation early in 1942 of the Luftwaffe Feldeinheiten (Air
Force Field Units), without whose assistance the situation in the East could
hardly have been mastered.
4. Both offensive and
defensive operations in 1942 proved once again the necessity of extensive
direct support of the army by bomber formations of the Luftwaffe, and the same
experience was had in the African theatre of war.
5. Further developments in
the Eastern Front situation during the retreat in the Summer and Autumn of 1943
when the Front was being straightened, necessitated ever greater co-operation
by the Luftwaffe with the ground forces. The added urgency of the position is
due not to any inferiority of our own infantry but to the overwhelming
superiority of the Russians in men and material. The result of this is that all
formations of the strategic Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front are engaged in
supporting the army in its fight against Russian superiority and that no forces
are therefore available for strategic air warfare. This means that no
operations are possible against the Russian Hinterland, industry and
communications. The Russian war machine is able to run at full speed, war
production is unimpaired and supplies can reach the Front without difficulty.
The great moral value of strategic bombing is therefore lost; even a few severe
attacks can introduce a feeling of insecurity and unrest which can have
disturbing results on the whole economy of a nation. At present the Russians
are able to work undisturbed and in complete security in the Hinterland.
Furthermore, as a result of the withdrawal the distance between the Front and
the industrial regions of Eastern Germany has become so small that the
possibility of Russian air attacks against the industrial areas of Upper
Silesia and Poland, and also against German Baltic harbours must be considered.
In spite of the destruction of bases carried out by us during the retreat, the
Russians are capable, as is known by experience, of harnessing all conceivable
resources and reconstructing these bases for attacks on German industries in
the East. This they will be able to achieve without interference from the
Luftwaffe.
6. These very
circumstances demand a speedy and complete release of these formations of the
strategic air force for the resumption of offensive warfare. Considerations of
existing and future fronts renders this demand imperative. On the Italian front
it is essential to employ ground attack formations in order to permit both
strategic and ground support operations.
7. Apart from the Russian
and Italian Fronts the preparations for an Anglo-American invasion raised the
possibility of a Third Front. To combat an invasion attempt which is certain to
be supported by strong infantry and airborne forces, powerful ground attack
forces will be required for action against the enemy during landing operations
and also against airborne troops behind the immediate coastal zone,
particularly in view of the small forces available to us and the narrowness of
the combat zone. The bomber units now operating against England will also, from
the very start of the invasion, have to be employed against the enemy landings.
However, after the abandonment of the strategic war against Russia, the units
hitherto employed in the East will be available for operations against England.
8. A further result of the
use of the Luftwaffe in support of the army is the unnecessary employment of
valuable and highly trained crews. Knowledge and skill acquired in the long and
costly training in navigation and long distance bombing is by the very nature
of ground attack operations completely wasted. Not only is navigational
dexterity and practise lost on missions where only visual observation is
necessary (the crew knows its sector of the front and there is no necessity,
and often no opportunity, for complex navigational methods) but mental aptitude
is also very often diminished.
9. The ground attack pilot
was the task of attacking enemy positions, salients and even infantry and tanks
with bombs and cannon fire. The aircraft designed for strategic bombing are
unsuited for such missions. Bombs dropped from a great height can only be used
successfully if a saturation attack is made, and in any case recognition of
small targets is difficult from such an altitude. If employed on low level
attacks, these bombers, even when protected by fighters, suffer losses
altogether disproportionate to the success they achieve. Aircraft specially
designed for this type of combat, such as the FW 190, are necessary, and these
can operate without fighter escort. The Ju 87 cannot even be considered for
ground strafing purposes in view of its low speed and the formidable flak and
fighter defenses now encountered. The Reichsmarschall has ordered that its
production be discontinued and replaced by that of FW 190s.
10. Urgent consideration
should therefore be given to the problem of whether a number of FW 190s
originally intended for use as fighters should not be allocated as ground
attack aircraft with a view to building up a strong ground attack force for the
following purposes:-
(i)
To help the army in its difficult defensive struggle and its later
offensive campaigns with the best weapon available at the present time (FW
190).
(ii)
To free bomber crews as soon as possible for their own tasks.
(iii)
To employ aircraft which are costly to produce and ill-suited for
ground attack, more reasonably and in a way more compatible with their
possibilities than has been done hitherto.
Source: Australian War Memorial AWM 54 423/4/103 Part 83